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KOREA
AGRICULTURAL WHOLESALE MARKETING PROJECT
(Loan 2111-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Preface
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) of the Agricultural
Wholesale Marketing Project for which Loan 2111-KO was approved on March
25, 1982, in the amount of US$50.0 million. The Loan was closed on
schedule on June 30, 1985 and US$19.39 million was cancelled.
The PCR was prepared by Seoul Metropolitan Government (Part A) and
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (Part B). The Asia Regional
staff prepared the Overview and Evaluation Summary based, inter alia, on
the Staff Appraisal Report; the President's Report; the Loan Agreement;
supervision reports; and various project-related Bank files.
This PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED).
The draft report was sent to the Borrower for comments on February 16,
1990, for comments by April 6, 1990, but none were received.
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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA: AGRICULTURAL WHOLESALE MARKETING PROJECT (LN. 2111-KO)
BASIC DATA SHEET
KEY PROJECT DATA
Actual as 2
Appraisal Actual or of Appraised
Estimates Est. Actual Estimate
Total Project Cost US M illion 101.25 71.4 70.522
Loan Amount S Million 50.00 30.61 61.231
Date Physical Components Completed 6184 6185
Proportion Completed by
that Date (2) 100 100
Economic Rate of Return Z 25 13.5
Financial Performance Weak
Institutional Performance Satisfactory
Cost of Funds - Current (2) 11.6 22.6
Deflated Cost of Funds (2) N.A. 16.8
STAFF DfUT
STatffwkw)
FY77 FY76 FY79 FY80 FY61 FYM2 FY6S FY84 FY86 FYS6 FY67 TOTAL
Preappralsal 85.1 87.6 176.8 9.6 27.6 266.6
Approle.1 41.8 B8.8 77.5
t.gotlatlon 6.1 8.1
Supervision 4.6 14.9 10.8 4.7 .0 1.4 87.0
Other .2 .1 .8 1.6 .5 2.7
Toutl 85.1 86.0 178.4 9.6 09.4 46.6 14.9 10.6 6.1 .6 1.4 412.0
CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS
FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86
Appraisal Estimate (US$ M) 1.7 15.4 43.6 50.0
Actual (US$ M) 0 9.0 17.9 29.2 30.6
Actual as Z of Estimate 0 58.4 41.2 58.5
Date of Final Loan Disbursement: January 10, 1986
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PROJECT DATES
Actual
Negotiations February 11, 1982
Board Approval March 25, 1982
Loan Agreement May 4, 1982
Loan Effectiveness August 6, 1982
Loan Closing Date June 30, 1985
MISSION DATA
No. of No. of Staff- Date of
Dates Weeks Persons Weeks Report
Reconnaissance FAO/CP 11/76 4 3 12 12/13/76
Preparation FAOICP 4/77 2.5-6 7 28 6110177
Preparation FAOICP 10177 3 N.A. N.A. 12/02/177
Preparation IBRD 3/78 1.5 3 4.5 3/30/78
Preparation IBRD 7/78 2.5-6 6 32 7/31/78
Preappraisal IBRD 10/78 N.A. 11 N.A. 11/16/78
Preappraisal IBRD 2/79 2 1 2 4/19/79
Preappraisal IBRD 2/80 1 2 2 N.A.
Preappraisal IBRD 5/80 1.5 2 3 5123180
Appraisal IBRD 5/81 N.A. 8 N.A. 3/1/82
Total 83.5+
Supervision 1 6/82 2 3 6 7/30/82
Supervision 2 11/82 1 4 4 2/09/83
Supervision 3 4/83 1.5 2 3 5/02/83
Supervision 4 11/83 2 1 2 1/10/84
Supervision 5 12/84 2 3 6 1/30/85
Total 21
OTHER PROJECT DATA
Borrower: Government of Korea
Executing Agency: Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG)
Fiscal Year of Borrower: Janwary 1 - December 31
Name of Currency: Korean Won (W)
Currency Exchange Rate:
Appraisal Year Average (1981) US$ 1.00 - Won 681
Intervening Years Average (1982-84) US$ 1.00 - Won 771
Completion Year Average (1985) US$ 1.00 - Won 870
Follow-up Project: None
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PROJECT CCFPLETION REPORT
ROREA
AGRICULlTMW UHOSALE HARXETING PROJECT
(Loan 2111-KO)
EVALUATION SUONARY
Introduction
i. The Agricultural Wholosale Marketing Project was financed under
Loan 2111-KO, approved in 1982. The project aimed at improving the
efficiency of agricultural marketing by initially building a new wholesale
market in Seoul. Total project costs were estimated at US$102.0 Uillion,
against which an IBRD Loan of US$50.0 million was negotiated. It was
expected that the project would be completed by June 30, 1984 and the Loan
would close on June 30, 1985.
it. Rapidly rising consumer incomes have prompted significant changes
and improvements in the Korean diet over the past two decades. These
changes and improvements include increased consumption of better quality
fruits and vegetables and marine products. At the same time, the
concentration of population in the capital city of Seoul and the relative
affluence of the Seoul population compared with the remainder of the
country has prompted an even higher growth in Seoul consumption rates when
compared wvith the country as a whole as well as posing an increasing burden
on the distribution system for the above products.
iii. Implementation began in late 1982 after a short delay. All
physical facilities were completed. A large, relatively efficient market
was built which serves the needs of Seoul's affluent population. Because
of an over-estimation of project investment costs, about US$10.7 million
was cancelled.
Obiectives
iv. The overall objective of the project was to promote increased
efficiency in the marketing system for fruits, vegetables and morine
products, particularly for the Seoul area which consumes proportionately
more of these products than other areas of the country; through closing
down the illegal Yongsan wholesale market and putting a modern new market
for the first time under the managemeuat of the government. The specific
objectives of the project included:
(a) Promotion of a more competitive price formation mechanism
through provision of adequate auction facilities, reduction of
intra-market congestion, creation of a market authority to
foster fair and competitive trade practices and improvement of
the marketing information systems;
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(b) Increasing the efficiency of the agricultural marketing system
throughout the country In general and Seoul in particular by
establishing of a new market in a sufficiently competitive
atmosphere and with a throughput large enough to have a
significant impact on price formation throughout the country,
shortening the marketing chain by establishing consignment
wholesale companies to 6Ct as receiving agencies for primary
producers and by enabling institutional buyers and retailer
groups to purchase directly from the auction floor, reducing
buyers' need to inspect the entire merchandise by promoting
adoption of standardized grading, packaging and weights,
reducing intramarket spoilage by providing adequate storage
facilities ant reducing delivery and collection costs by
locating the market in the outskirts of the city.
(c) Establishment of a basis for Improving public policies and
institutions affecting agricultural marketing by a study of
trading practices, licensing policies, marketing legislation,
tax legislation, produce assembling systems, distribution
channels and cost structure and various marketing support
services including transportation, credit and storage.
Proiect Rationale
v. From the late 1960s to 1980, the Korean marketing system underwent
rapid change. In the 1960s there was a low level of surpluses over farmer-
home consumption needs, most food was consumed where it was produce and the
primary marketing channels consisted of country assemblerlshippers who also
provided production credit. By the late 1970s most farmers were commercial
rather than subsistence oriented and the majority of produce was shipped
directly to wholesale markets in urban areas either by individual farmers
or through cooperatives.
vi. Prior to the construction of the Karak-dong market, fruits and
vegetables and marine products marketing needs for the city of Seoul were
served by two public wholesale markets, 14 quasi-wholesale markets and four
NACF (National Agricultural Cooperative Federation) marketing centers for
fruits and vegetables; and one public wholesale market, four quasi-
wholesale markets and two NFFC (National Federation of Fisheries
Cooperatives) marketing centers for marine products. The public wholesale
markets were licensed by the Seoul City Government (SCG), the cooperative
markets by the Ministry of Agriculture and the quasi-wholesale markets were
either licensed retail (not wholesale) food markets or unlicensed
facilities. The quasi-wholesalers accounted for 60-70X of total wholesale
transactions.
vii. The 'quasi-wholesaleru is an institution that is perhaps unique to
Korea. Qpasi-wholesale markets refer to markets which are authorized by
the Law of Marketing as retail markets or which in some cases are not
authorized by any laws or regulations but which regardless of their
essentially illegal status perform agricultural product wholesaling
functions.
- vI -
viii. Market facilities at Yongsen and other quasi-wholesale markets and
at the authorized wholesale markets were generally Inadequate, prfimitive
and poorly maintained. Rate of spoilage averaged at least 152. The only
generally available source of market information consisted of dealer
experience and Individual telephone surveys. The wholesale markets in
generally were increasingly unable to cope with thu demand for fresh fruits
and vegetables and marine products by consumers In the Seoul municipality.
While Seoul accommodates 252 of the total Korean population, Seoul
residents account for about 40X of total personal Income and purchase 50%
of the fruit marketed in Korea.
ix. Some 2,288,033 metric tons of fruits and vegetables and 390,00 mt
of marine products were marketed in Seoul in 1978. In 1970 there were only
two supermarkets in the entire country. By 1980 there were 330
supermarkets in Seoul alone. (By 1989 there were more than 1,000
supermarkets in Seoul, with an additional 10 major department stores which
featured high-quality fresh produce sections In their food retailing
premises). Legal wholesale and zooperative markets handled 282 of the
total wholesale trade in fruits and vegetables and 602 of the marine
products in 1980. Quasi-wholesalers handled 722 of total fruit and
vegetable wholesale trade and 402 of total marine products. In 1980 652 c
all fruits and vegetables were marketed through the Yongsan quasi-wholesale
market, 202 through the Cheongryangri market and 152 through other
wholesale markets. The Noryangjin wholesale market handled 382 of total
marine products, Cheongryangri 142, Youngsan 112, and other markets 372.
X. Per capita consumption of fruits grew from 6.6 kg in 1962 to 18.6
kg in 1977. By 1988, per capita fruit consumption had Increased to 31 kg.
Vegetable per capita consumption increased from 41.8 kg to 93.4 kg between
1962 and 1977. Total national production of fruits and vegetables in 1962
was 150,000 mt and 1.2 million mt respectively. By 1976 this had grown to
615,000 mt and 3.2 million mt.
xi. Marketing of fruits and vegetables in 1980, when the planning of
the Karak-dong market was in full swing, was still characterized by extreme
seasonal price variations. The gross margin between farmgate and consumer
prices averaged about 472. Most produce coming into the wholesale markets
was upgraded, badly sorted and Improperly packaged. The sparse market news
that was available was based on bewildering variety of non-uniform weights,
measures, grades and sizes. Quasi-wholesale market commissions averaged 8-
92. Spoilage at central wholesale markets was about 151 overall.
xii. The Yongsan quasi-wholesale market, which accounted for
substantially more than half of the fruit and vegetables marketed In Seoul,
was located in a heavily populated and congested area. Average turnaround
time for trucks bringing produce into the market was about seven to 10
hours. Roads leading into and out of the market and to primary retail
distribution points were inadequate and heavily traveled.
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xiii. The companies that were licensed by the SCG to operate both the
authorized wholesale markets and the retail markets which became quasi-
wholesale markets, Including Yongsan, were more interested in collecting
rents than in facilitating an efficient marketing system. The main reason
for the control by the quasi-wholesale markets of a major share of the
wholesale market volumes was the fact that since their markets were only
licensed for retail sales of food products, the shippers, wholesalers and
jobbers operating in *' asi-wholesale market not only escaped the normal
taxes levied on these vusinesses as well as almost all of the red tape that
burdened the licenaed wholesalers in the authorized wholesale markets, but
could also levy higher marketing margins. As a consequence, the quasi-
wholesalers could offer a much higher volume of credit to shippers. Thus
credit availability was the main determinant of which markets received the
higher volume of trade.
xiv. The cooperative marketing centers and authorized wholesale markets
attempted to sell produce and marine products by auction. This was not
always possible due to variations in quality and packaging, but he majority
was sold at auction. In the quasi-wholesale markets sales were made
through negotiation.
Xv. One of the primary benefits anticipated by the Korea government in
planning for the Karak-dong market was that it would make it possible to
close down the Yongsan market as well as other, less 4 mportant quasi-
wholesale markets at the same time increase the efficiency of the total
marketing system. The auction system was to be implemented for all produce
sold in the new market to Increase pricing efficicncy.
Implementation Experience
xvi. The project planning stage lasted from 1976 to early 1982.
Discussions between the ROK government and the Bank on measures to improve
agricultural marketing initially started in late 1976. A total of 10
reconnaissance, preparation, preappraisal and appraisal missions were
fielded by the Bank prior to the actual approval of the Loan.
xvil. The primary reasons for the large numbs- of missions required and
the attendant time lag between initial discussio).s and actual project
implementation appear to have been the frequent changes in both Korean
government personnel concerned and the may shifts In emphasis that this
occasioned; and the numerous basic disagreements between the various IBRD
mission personnel and Republic of Korea (ROK) officials as to the design of
the project.
xviii. Progress of project implementation following the Loan Agreement
until early 1987 is covered in the attached PCR. The following paragraphs
should help clarify the development of the maiirket from the tine it was
opened for business in 1986 until mid-1989.
xix. It should be noted that from the start there was a basic
difference in concept toward financial operations of the market between the
ROK government and the Bank -- a difference that was perhaps not fully
- viii -
appreciated by the Bank personnel involved in planning, appraising and
approving the Loan. This difference relates to the degree to which the
government should provide and pay for public marketing facilities. The
Loan Agreement Incorporated a covenant requiring the generation of
sufficient revenues from market rents, fees and other charges to cover the
market's operating costs, depreciation and loan repayments. Despite this
provision, the basic philosophy of the Korean goverment as represented by
the Seoul City Government (SCG) and the Miaistry of Agriculture appears to
be that market facilities represent public infrastructure and as such,
should be provided at government expense. Fees and charges are set at a
level that will defray operating expenses and interest but does not cover
amortization.
Table l 1988 Receipts and Expenditures, SAMACO
Income Billion Won
Market user fees 2.458
Rentals 2.808
Administration and maintenance fees 2.671
Total 7.937
Expenses
Operations 2.271
Interest 2.045
Other 2.425
Total expenses 6.741
Xx. The market was projected to reach full capacity within five years
from start-up. Estimated throughput was to be 31030 mt of fruits and
vegetables (640 fruit, 2,390 vegetables) per day; plus 540 mt marine
products. All produce was to be auctioned. The market was planned to
accommodate four fruit and vegetable wholesaling companies with 48
vegetable jobbers and 28 fruit jobbers each plus four auetioneers. The
fisheries market was planned for two wholesalers and 100 jobbers.
xxi. In 1987, the first full year of operation, total daily throughput
amounted to 3,378 mt. Total 1988 throughput averaged 3,767 mt per day.
This official figure probably considerably understates the actual market
volume since many of the jobbers do not report all of their transactions.
The market accounts for more than 401 of the total Seoul daily supply of
fruits and vegetables.
xxii. The market actually reached full capacity shortly after the first
year of operation. This was due to the large number of firms and
individuals that wanted to participate in the market. The market became a
source of political patronage with everyone who had political contacts and
wanted into the market able to force his way in through political pressure.
Since the number of authorized wholesale companies was fixed, the market
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authorities were therefore forced to accommodate more than five times the
planned number of jobbers. At least 502 of the present jobbers act in fact
as wholesalers. The situation is further complicated by the fact that
representatives of the same companies, or families, often are members of a
wholesale company, are jobbers and also retailers in the market. At the
present time, although about 202 of the original jobbers have been forced
out by excessive competition, there are nine authorized wholesale
companies, 1,400 middlemen or jobbers, 30 dealers and 2,000 retailers
operating in the market.
xxiii. For the first two years of market operation, many of the middlemen
were forced to operate from temporary stalls in the parking lots due to
lack of space. Sufficient accommodations have since been provided to
adequately house all of the middlemen.
xxiv. The market is visited by 40,000 vehicles per day including 20,000
personal cars and 1,500 large produce trucks. About 120,000 people pass
through the market each day. The original plan did not include housing for
retailers. The market when first planned was located in a remote area of
the city, with few people in the surrounding area. By the time
construction was completed, however, the Karak-dong area was becoming a
heavily populated bedroom community for Seoul, with the development of
thousands of condominium apartments accelerated by the completion nearby of
the Olympic Village and Olympic sports facilities. Newly affluent Seoul
residents acquired automobiles as well as a taste for fresh fruits,
vegetables and marine products. The huge parking lot at the Karak-dong
market made it easy for car-owning consumers to shop there.
xxv. As a result, very soon after the market opened there was an influx
of retailers who set up shop on the sidewalks and spaces in front of the
jobber stalls. Bowing to reality, the market authority by the end of 1986
had constructed a building to house "direct sales' which is a euphemism for
retailing. At the present time retailers account for about half of the
total business enterprises in the market.
xxvi. Despite the original plan to auction all products passing through
the market, only about 601 of the total fruits and less than 102 of the
vegetables are actually sold at auction. The reason for this is the
continuing lack of grading, standardization and suitable packaging. Some
80-902 of the total marine products marketed are auctioned.
xxvii. In addition to the facilities originally planned for the market,
there has been a continuous expansion almost since the market opened to
serve the needs of participants, suppliers and consumers. The first direct
sale market building, consisting of 18,000 sq meters with a total of 1,600
retail spaces, was completed in December 1986. In May 1988 an additional
building was constructed to separate the remaining jobbers from the
wholesalers. A dried pepper market was opened in May 1987. The garlic
market went on-stream in December 1987. A second dried fish market was
built in 1988. Also in 1988 a meat market with facilities for slaughtering
350 cattle and 1,000 hogs per day was opened, which presently accounts for
30% of the total Seoul meat supply. A number of other new facilities are
on the drawing board A park-like area planted with 90,000 trees has also
been developed.
Market Structure
xxviii. The management of the market is entrusted to a public corporation,
the Seoul Agricultural and Marine Products Wholesale Market Management
Corporation (SAMACO). The jobbers who are allied with each of the
authorized wholesaler companies are organized into separate jobber
associationi. These In turn are organized into an overall Jobber's
Federation which deals with the management corporation on matters of
concern to market participants.
xxix. SAMACO employs a total of 259 people. There are 555 separate
enterprises operating in the market. These employ 2,423 workers.
XXX. Labor is unionized in the Karak-dong market. The growing general
labor unrest in Korea has not bypassed the market.. There are increasing
demands by Karak-dong labor unions for higher pay and better working
conditions.
xxxi. The wholesale companies pay SAMACO a user fee amounting to 0.5S of
total transactions. Jobbers pay no user fees, although they pay a
proportionate share for utilities, cleaning and maintenance. The retailers
pay guarantee money, or "key money", (this is a Korean commercial custom,
with the guarantee money kept in an interest bearing accounts with interest
accruing to the landlord until such time as the tenant ceases to occupy the
premises, when the guarantee money is returned to the tenant) of one
million won for each retail space, plus W 100,000 per month for utilities
and maintenance. The various related markets, service stations, bank,
etc., pay a flat rental fee to SAMACO.
Proiect Results
xxxii. The project has provided large, functional, less congested
facilities which have made it possible to more adequately meet the demands
of the increasingly affluent Seoul population for better quality fruits,
vegetables and marine products. It has improved the movement of produce in
and out of the market as well as promoting greater efficiency of intra-
market operations. It has also greatly Improved the marketing information
situation vis-a-vis farmers and shippers throughout the nation.
xxxiii. It has not, however, significantly reduced total food marketing
margins nor has it succeeded in appreciably reducing consumer food prices,
although it may have succeeded in raising farmer prices to a limited
extent. The market also has not been able to influence the marketing
system to the extent anticipated nor has it led to appreciable improvements
in country grading, sorting and packaging of fruits and vegetables except
to a limited degree.
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xxxiv. The Xarak-dong market project has produced mixed results. It has
provided a m-Asive, clean and sanitary modern facility through which almost
half of the total fruits, vegetables and marine products consumed in Seoul
are marketed. Without this facility or one like it, it is highly doubtful
that the city's marketing facilities could satisfactorily meet the demands
of Seoul's 10-million population.
xxxv. This is the fzlrst wholesale market operated directly by the
government (through a public corporation). Government management has cut
down considerably on unfair trading practices, collusion and other adverse
practices that in the past characterized both authorized public wholesale
markets and the quasi-wholesale markets.
xxxvi. The chaotic conditions and congestion that characterized the
Yongsan market have been eliminated. Turnaround tlme for trucks bringing
produce into the Karak-dong market averages three hours, compared with the
previous seven to ten yours at Yongsan,. The market is readily accessible
from the major arteries that serve as transport links between production
areas and Seoul city. Spoilage in the market has been reduced by at least
20S from Yongsan market levels.
xxxvii. A higher percentage of fruits and marine products are auctioned
than under the former quasi-wholesaler dominated system. This means on the
whole, a more open and fairer pricing function.
xxxviii. Access to market information has been greatly improved, compared
to the almost total lack of price and supply information except on the part
of experienced dealers at the Yongsan market. At the present time, price
and volume information is collected continuously by SAMACO and transmitted
through radio, newspapers, television and other media, throughout the
nation. This price information is utilized by farmers nationwide in their
negotiations with shippers, as well as by middlemen at all levels of the
marketing chain.
xxxix. The development of the Karak-dong market has given further impetus
and is serving as a model for the development of similar wholesale markets
in other areas. The ROK government plans to establish three additional
markets in Seoul, in the northern, eastern and western quadrants of the
city, and nine markets in other major urban areas. Three municipal
wholesale markets have already been established outside of Seoul. Ground
should be broken for the first of these three additional Seoul City
wholesale markets by the end of 1989. The major reasons for the delay in
establishing the three additional Seoul markets has been the skyrocketing
price of real estate, which has priced the most desirable locations outside
the reach of the SCG.
xxxx. Given the general development patterns in Seoul, it is
questionable whether a single market site as large as Karak-dong represents
the most efficient means of distributing produce to the city, as compared
to a number of smaller markets dispersed throughout the metropolitan area.
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xxxxi. Official wholesale margins have been reduced somewhat from the 8-
9S prevailing in the former quasi-wholesale markets, to a maximum of 6.6S
for fruit and vegetable wholesalers and 5.0Z for marine products dealers at
Karak-dong. It is difficult to determine whether total margins have
actually decreased, however. The Karak-dong jobbers, or middlemen also
charge a commission of 4.0% for fruits and vegetables and 3.01 for marine
products.
xxxxii. Marketing margins for fruits and vegetables averaged about 471
from farmgate to consumer prior to the opening of the Karak-dong market.
It is doubtful that these margins have been significantly reduced,
particularly since retail margins for fruits and vegetables still average
201 to 301 depending on the particular commodity.
xxxxiii. Although Korean incomes have doubled in real terms since 1983, the
percentages of income spent on food has remained about the same, at
approximately 251, since the beginning of the current decade. This is
another indication that improvements in the marketing system have not
appreciably reduced marketing margins.
xxxxiv. While the original market development plan called for auctioning
of all products in the new market, this has not been realised, particularly
in the case of vegetables. The primary reason is the lack of adequate
grades and standards, poor sorting and inadequate packaging at country
origin points.
xxxxv. The physical facilities at the Karak-dong market are modern and
well-planned to promote maximum efficiency. The use of these facilities,
however, is far from efficient. Most movement of produce within the market
is handled manunlly. There is very little mechanization or automation.
Produce is auctioned one box at a time with no volume transactions. It is
questionable whether the market can continue to operate in this
inefficient, labor intensive mode for very much longer, given the current
rapid increase in Korean wages and salaz4es.
xxxxvi. There has been continual intramural squabbling in the market,
between the cooperative wholesale companies and the private companies,
among the various jobbers and dealers, among wholesalers, jobbers and
retailers and between all of the above user groups and the management
company. This has been a continuing source of anxiety to the SCG and the
Ministry of Agriculture. Most of the problems stem from the excess number
of participants allowed into the market due to political influence at
start-up.
xxxxvii. The construction of the market and the allocation of space to
market participants became a source of major financial irregularities.
This has contributed to the conviction and jailing of several senior
officials and/or their relatives from the previous administration and is a
source of considerable embarrassment to the present administration. Anyone
in a position of authority over the market is very reluctant to discuss
market affairs with outsiders as a result of the ongoing scandals that are
still being uncovered.
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xxxxviii. The market is not operating as planned, with the anticipated
clearcut distinctions between wholesale companies and jobbers. There
remains considerable overlap with the jobbers in many cases also
functioning as wholesalers. A totally unforeseen element was the necessity
of admitting retailers to the market--these now make up about half of the
total market participants.
il. Have the original objectives been achieved? The first objective,
that of promoting more competitive price formation, has been almost
completed met. Intra-market congestion has been reduced, a market
authority was created to foster fair and competitive trade practices and
the marketing information system has been greatly improved. Adequate
auctioning facilities have been provided although they are not fully
utilized due to the problems mentioned above. Having said all this, it
should also be recognised, however, that the market has not resulting In
significantly lowering marketing margins. The pricing competition occurs
within the wholesale sector.
1. The efficiency of the agricultural marketing system throughout the
country in general and Seoul in particular has been improved. The new
market has been established in a sufficiently competitive atmosphere and
with a throughput large enough to have a significant impact on price
formation throughout the country. The marketing chain has not been
appreciably shortened, however and institutional buyers and retailer groups
are still unable in the majority of cases to buy directly from th* auction
floor, except in the case of marine products. The market has been unable
to effectively promote adoption of standardized grading, packaging and
weights. It has, however, reduced intramarket spoilage by providing
adequate storage facilities and reducing delivery and collection costs by
locating the market in the outskirts of the city, except that these
outskirts have now become a major population center.
_-. It is difficult to determine how effectively the third objective
has been met, that of establishing a basis for improving public policies
and institutions through conducting various marketing-related studies.
While there has been some Improvement in policies and institutions relating
to agricultural marketing, the system as it presently operates is still
seriously flawed.
lil. An immediate objective, that of closing down the Yongsan quasi-
wholesale market, wa achieved with the opening of Karak-dong. The full
economic benefits expected from devoting the former market space to a
higher-value retail consumer electronics market similar to Akihibara in
Japan have not materialized, however, with only part of the available space
taken up by electronics retailers.
Lessons Learned
liii. The major liability during the project planning and design stage
was the failure of the various IBRD staff and consultants concerned to
adequately recognize the existing marketing environment and systems in
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Korea and the strength of those systems; nor was adequate attention paid to
the attitudes and sensibilities of the ROK government. As a result, the
project has not produced the changes in ;he marketing system that were
originally contemplated.
liv. Several important lessons derived from the Karak-dong market
project may be applied by the Bank to future such endeavors elsewhere.
lv. First, during the planning stages insufficient account was taken
of the already existing marketing environment and systems in Korea nor of
the government philosophy towards establishment of public markets. This
started with the original FAO/IBRD prefeasibility study in 1977. The FAO
team zefused to recognize the importance of these existing systems and
their cultural base, and as a result the PAO team and their counterparts
from Korea Development Institute (KDI) by the end of the study were not
speaking to each other. At one point the head of the FAO team attempted to
have the counterpart Bureau Chief in the Ministry of Agriculture fired.
The FAO team and the KDI counterpart team submitted separate, conflicting
reports at the conclusion of the study. These basic misunderstandings
between the foreign and Korean parties went on throughout the preparation
and design of the project.
lvi. Insufficient attention was given during the conceptualization and
planning stages to the human element, i.e., no sociological or socio-
political analyses were attempted -- rather, the project planning by the
IBXD representatives was based solely on economic and technical
considerations which failed to take into account the existing cultural,
social, political and business/marketing environment in which the market
was to function. As a result the objective of reforming the basic
marketing system was never fully realized.
lvii. The shift in population growth in the Seoul area, which was
already beginning to manifest itself during the final planning stages for
the market, was not taken into account. This might or might not have
affected the final form of the market if fully recognized.
lviii. In suary, the project plan and design was based on theoretical
and technical considerations which were probably quite sound. The planners
and designers failed to take into account, however, the realities of the
Korean environment which were to impact significantly on the operations of
the market itself and on the hoped-for changes in the marketing systems and
institutions.
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PROJECT CCHPLETION REPORT
ROREA
AGRICULTURAL WHOLESALE HARKETING PROJECT
(Loan 2111-KO)
OVERVIEW
1. Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) and the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries (MAP) have submitted Project Completion Reports
for their respective parts of the project. The division has reviewed the
reports and summarised the highlights of the project in the following
Overview.
Introduction
2. At the request of the Government of Korea, the Bank assisted in
financing the Agricultural Wholesale Marketing Project (Loan 2111-KO) which
aimed at improving the marketing of fruit, vegetables and fish. The
project was to provide for the construction of a modern wholesale market in
Seoul, the establishment of an authority to operate it, training programs
for officials and traders, improvement of market information services and a
study of the entire marketing system in Korea. It was to be the first step
in the Government's long term plan to increase the efficiency of the
agricultural marketing system to the benefit of consumers and producers.
The Loan and Project Agreements were signed on May 4, 1982 and became
effective on August 6, 1982.
Prolect Identification. Preparation and Appraisal
3. Discussions between the Government and the Bank on measures to
improve agricultural marketing started in late 1976. For the next two
years, the Government efforts were directed to the preparation of a project
involving a wide range of components, notably slaughter houses, cold
storage facilities, refrigerated trucks, and an agricultural marketing
center in the vicinity of Seoul. Towards the end of 1978, the Government
decided to focus on the most urgent problem of improving the marketing
situation in Seoul by constructing a modern wholesale market for
horticultural and marine products. The subsequent period starting in early
1979 was devoted to the collection and analysis of basic data on the status
of agricultural marketing in Seoul, followed by the preparation of detailed
engineering designs which were completed in March 1981. Korea Development
Institute (KDI) and the FAOICP were involved during the early stages of the
project preparation, with SMG and Korea Rural Economics Institute (KREI)
taking over responsibility for project preparation in the later stages.
Frequent changes of Government officials contributed to some delay in
processing the project. The project was appraised by the Bank in May 1981.
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4. The principal features of the project were:
(a) construction of the Karag-dong agricultural wholesale market in
Seoul consisting of a fruit and vegetable market, a fish market, a
related item market and retail stores, cold storage facilities, an
administration building and utility facilities;
(b) construction of about 3.5 km of market-related roads, including an
underpass, intramarket streets and parking facilities;
(c) establishment of the Karag-dong Agricultural Market Authority;
(d) a study of Korea's agricultural market system; and
(e) provision of local and overseas training.
5. The following points were discussed during Negotiations, recorded
in the Minutes, and reflected in the Loan and Project Agreements:
(a) The term of the loan would be 14 years including a 3-year grace
period to help accommodate (i) the longer than normal grace period
required by the Borrower in the Korea Technology Development
Project and ($$) the market authority's reduced earnings on
security deposits due to lower interest rates.
(b) The estimated cost of consulting services for the market studies
was reduced to US$1.0 million after review of recent experience
with rates for such services performed by local consultants. The
Bank's negotiating team emphasized the need for timely
appropriation of funds for the market studies.
Xc) SMG would not be required to appoint an outside consultant to
supervise construction of the market since the Office of
Construction and Engineering (OCE), responsible for construction,
had an ample number of experienced staff capable of carrying out
this function. SMG might employ such a consultant if it
considered it necesoary.
Implementation
6. The main civil works contract was awarded to a Korean firm in
April 1982 following ICB. The contract amount for the Bank-assisted
portion was W 32.897 billion (US$45.4 million); the contract included
construction of the meat market (W 1.56 billion (US$2.3 million)) which was
being financed wholly from Korean sources. By the time the contract was
awarded, a substantial amount of preparatory work had been carried out.
With a contract period of 24 months, construction was expected to be
completed by April 1984. Delays in construction were encountered due to
extensive changes in the sizes of piles as a result of test pile driving,
unexpected difficulties in bringing the precast concrete plant into
operation, problems with procurement of materials and reduced budget for
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local funds. None of these problems were major, but the cumulative effect
was to delay completion of the market to April 1985 and opening to August
1985. The construction delays called for postponing the various steps in
establishment and staffing of GAMA and for closing the existing Yongaan
market; the Loan and Project Agreements were amended in 1983 postponing by
six months the plan of action for closure of the Yongsan Market, the
appointment of an Advisory Committee for GAMA, submission of the GAMA
rules, articles, and market fee structure, the appointment of key GAMA
staff, end establishment of GAMA.
7. The market studies were divided Into three packages. Package 1
consisted of preliminary studies carried out by KREI and financed from
local funds. Package 2 consisted of studies carried out by a foreign
consulting firm and overseas study tours and was to be financed from the
Loan. Package 3 was covered by the contract between MAF and KREI and
included all the local costs associated with the studies; it was to be
financed from local funds. A consulting firm was selected for Package 2
and a contract with an estimated cost of US$500,000 was negotiated. The
Government later approved a local currency budget to cover the interest and
commitment charge on the loan funds used for Package 2 which limited its
total cost of US$300,000. KREI's experience with the consultants, however,
was not particularly favorable In that three experts were contracted and
only two stayed for the duration of their contracts.
8. The PCR estimates the total project costs at V 57.1 billion
(US$73.7 million /1) as compared to the appraisal estimate of W 69.9
billion (US$102.0), a cost saving of 181 in Won terms or 38S in US$ terms.
The project benefitted from the slow down in construction work In the
Middle East, which led to keen competition among Korean contractors.
Instead of the major contract for construction of the market costing W 35.9
billion (US$52 million) as estimated at appraisal, it was awarded for W
32.9 billion (US$45.4 million). During the course of lmplementation,
domestic inflation was brought under control; whereas price escalation of
141, 1 and 101 had been projected for the period 1982 to 1984, the
Wholesale Price Index showed a 4.71 increase for 1982, 0.2% for 1983 and
0.72 for 1984.
9. Disbursements lagged behind appraisal estimates throughout the
implementation period, running from 48 to 58S of the SAR estimates until
January 1985, when US$18.7 million was cancelled from the loan. SMO had
requested an increase in the disbursement rate for Category 1, which the
Bank had turned down in 1983 on the grounds that such an increase would put
the Bank's participation higher than 492, the estimated foreign exchange
component. SMG requested cancellation of US$10.7 million in January 1984
to which the Bank withheld agreement until MOF confirmed that local funds
were available for completing the project. In August, SMO requested
cancellation of an additional US$8.0 million and in Septembar 1984, the
Bank agreed to cancel US$18.7 million of the loan. The final allocation of
proceeds is compared with the SAR in the table below.
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Table 1s Allocation of Proceed&
Catetorv SAR Actusl
(1) Civil works 27.00 20.83
(2) Materials and equipment 12.00 5.56
(3) Ready-mix concrete and
asphaltic concrete 8.00 3.11
(4) Consultants' services and
overseas training 0.60 0.37
(5) Fee 0.75 0.74
(6) Unallocated 1.65 -
50.00 30.61
Operation of the Market
10. SMG established the authority responsible for managing the market
with the legal name of Seoul Agricultural and Marine Products Wholesale
Market Management Corporation (SAMACO), instead of the Karag-dong
Agricultural Market Authority (GAMA) as expected at appraisal. The Loan
and Project Agreements were duly amended to reflect the new name.
According to the 1985 Audit report and the PCR, SMG had to provide a
subsidy of about W 4.3 billion (US$5.4 million) to operate the market in
1985. Market revenues are less than expected at appraisal, mainly because
the Government has chosen to defer until some future time the collection of
fees for parking, freezer storage use, and rents for stores of jobbers,
auxiliary jobbers, and authorized wholesale companies. It is not clear why
SMG chooses to subsidize the market because it is fully utilized; temporary
facilities have been set up in the parking area for retailers and auxiliary
jobbers until additional buildings can be constructed to accommodate them.
Daily throughput of the market, estimated in the SAR to be 3,570 tons of
fruit, vegetables and fish is now estimated at 3,630 tons in the second
year of operation.
Covenants
11. The one covenant which has not been fulfilled relates to
generation of sufficient revenues from market rents; fees and other charges
to cover the market's operating costs, depreciation and loan repayment.
With this exception, all covenants were fulfilled. Progress reports were
timely and informative; audit reports on the project were submitted without
qualification. The establishment of the market authority and appointment
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of staff were carried out according to the revised schedule, and the
Yongsan market was closed and converted into an area for electronic
wholesalers.
Bank Performance
12. The PCR implies that SMG was dissatisfied with the Bank's
requirements for ICB (para 332 and 342) and its recommendations during
project preparation that building designs be changed to more modern types.
The Bank participated very actively In project preparation, including
computerized mapping of the distribution system in Seoul. The long
gestation period for the project with the numerous preparation and
preappraisal missions were probably irksome to the Borrower, though they
were just as much the result of indecision on Government's part as
persistence on the part of the Bank. During project Implementation,
rapport was hindered by a lack of (fluent) English-speaking staff in SMG
and a reluctance to share information on implementation difficulties with
supervision missions.
Economic Rate of Return
13. The Staff Appraisal Report estimated the Economic Rate of Return
to be 25%. The Project Completion Report (section VII) recommends
recalculation of this estimate when the full impact of the market is known,
but does not offer its own updated estimate. Pending such a full review,
the following subjective order of magnitude estimates, permit an ordorly
downward revision of the earlier estimate, while still suggesting
significant project benefits:
(a) Spoilage reduction has been achieved, with about 202 less spoilage
than the Yongsan Market, (202 of total benefits.)
(b) There has been little improvement in vegetable quality, and almost
no vegetables are being auctioned. There has, however, been some
increase in competitiveness and though prices have risen this
cannot meaningfully be separated from the primary inflationary
effects. (Benefits here might be downgraded from 372 to 152 of
total benefits.)
(c) Reduction in transport delays has been fully achieved (10% of
total benefits).
(d) Savings from backhauls due to better information provided by the
market has failed to materialize (from 102 to 01 of total
benefits).
(e) The projected electronics market at Yongsan has failed to achieve
anywhere near full occupancy (from 92 to 01 of total benefits).
Applying this correction to the original estimate of 25Z, and in the
absence of major discrepancies the projection of real costs, would give an
Economic Rate of Return of 13.51.
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Conclusions
14. The project has provided the physical infrastructure and the
institutional framework designed to promote more competitive price
formation mechanisms, increase the efficiency of the agricultural marketing
system particularly in Seoul, and establish a basis for Improv.ig public
policies and institutions affecting agricultural marketing. These were the
objectives set out in the SAR and expected to be achieved by construction
of the market, establishment of its management authority, and carrying out
the marketing study. The PCR implies that the improvement of the marketing
system has not been achieved as planned (para 225) but that It is
proceeding in the right direction. A decade has passed since the
Government approached the Bank for assistance in financing a marketing
project. During that time, the Karag-dong Market has been conceived,
planned and constructed; legislation has been passed to promote orderly and
efficient marketing of agricultural produce; and plans are under way to
establish similar markets In the other three quadrants of the city. The
agricultural marketing system in Korea is proceeding toward modernization
ad the operation of Karag-dong is one of the first steps in this
direction. The Loan wae fully prepared on July 31, 1986.
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I. INIRODUCTION
Ihe principal objective of the Garag-dong Agriculture & Fishery
Wholesale Marketing Project (the Project) is to increase the efficiency
of the agricultural marketing system throughout the country in general and
in Seoul in particular.
In connection with the financing of the Project, the Government of the
Republic of Korea (the Government) entered into a Loan Agreement (Loan No.
2111-KOR) on April 5, 1982 with the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Developnent (IBRD). On April 5, 1982, the Government entered into a
subsidiary loan agreement with the Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) to
make the proceeds ox the Lcan available to SMG. Also, SMG entered into the
Project Agreement on the same date with IBRD. The principal of the IBRD loan
was $31.3 million (originally $49.5 million).
II. PREPARATION & APPRAISAL OF THE PRC3JCT
A. Origin
Special Circumstances ;Background)
211-1 Protection of producers and consumers by improving marketing
structure
. Inducement of fair price formation by introducing an auction system.
. Increasing the efficiency of distribution by maintaining sufficient
market space and by having all the distribution-related facilities
.furnished with mordern equipment.
211-2 A need arising from Seoul's leading role in price formation for
agricultural & marine products.
* The metrcpolitan area of Seoul covers 627 sq. .km which is 0.6% of the
entire country in land area with 24% of the total population of the
nation.
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Such cities as Seongnam, Anyang, Eujeongbu and Bucheon are located
adjacent to Seoul.
herefore, there is the merit of curtailing transportation costs by
changing distribution channels and playing a leading role in price
formation.
211-3 A place easy of access, located 15km south-east from the center
of Seoul.
211-4 Other social benefits
Increase in eqDLoynWnt, environmental inprovement of the city,
contribution to the residents' preservation of health by sanitary
treatment of food.
• Price stabilization and distribution cost curtailment by strengthening
the distributicn information function.
, Such indirect benefit by alternative use of the Yongsan Market
site.
212 It was agreed upon between the Government and SMG when the Loan
Agreement was concluded between the Government and IBRD that S# can
use the loan proceeds for the Government's Agriculture & Fishery
Wholesale Market Construction Project (Ist Stage).
The preliminary study of the project was started by the Korea
Develcpment Institute (KDI), and from June 10th, 1978 to July 15th
1978, a task force team of the Food and Agricult;ure Organization
(FAO) and IsgD came to Korea to assist in ompleting the plan of the
Project.
The 5M settled its long-term Agriculture & Fishery Wholesale
Marketing Project Funda ental Plan by dividing the Seoul area into four
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geographical divisions.-
213 The original plan was to rearrange the sdippinig system and to promte
the standardization of merchandise and packaging and to open up a large
nwuber of stores. However, such plan was abandoned because of the
difficulty in reforming Korea's old trade practice and the mentality
of the residents in the producers' areas.
The construction of a grain market within the Garag-dong Market was
also considered but subsequently rejected due to traffic problems.
Another location was selected as the site for a grain market.
B. Preparation, Appraisal, Negotiation and Approval
221 In August of 1977, according to its decision for the construction
of an agriculture and fishery distribution center, the Government had
the Agriculture & Fishery Distribution Structure Modernization Project
reflected in the 5th Economic & Social Develoinent Five-Year Plan,
and the Ministry of Finance obtained a resolution of the Cabinet
Council on March 5, 1982 to.aborrow 50 million dollars to finance the
construction of the Garag-dong Market.
222 SMB established the Garag-dong Market Construction Fundamental Plan
in April of 1980. Prior to this, KDI ccpleted its study on the
establishment of the Fundamental Plan. Tme Korea Rural EcoBamics
Institute (KREI) carried out its investigation to determine the
appropriate market size, and FAD and IBPD assisted in concluding the
Prcject Plan by atching a task force team.
IBED suggested to play a construction consultant role but this
was rejected because SMG's capability was deemed sufficient.
KDI's study for the Fundamental Plan and REI 's Market Size Study
were reflected in. the Fundamental Plan.
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The size of the market did not alter from the original plan.
But the grain market which was originally planned to be constructed
within the Garag-dong Market was decided to be built near the
Yangjaedong tollgate on account of traffic congestion in the Garag-dong
area which had not been. taken into consideration in the original plan.
Ihe construction was originally planned to be ccleted by May of
1984, but was delayed until May of 1985. The separation of the grain
market is considered realistic and the decision therefor was reached
by a mutual agreement.
223 No details of the Agreement were violated except that the site of
the slaughtering facilities was changed to the outskirts of the city
on IBMD's suggestion.
224 The Project was carried out without any setbacks and there were
no abnormal delays.
225 The improvement of the marketing system has not been achieved as
planned because of the traditional trade concept of the Korean people
at the present time. However, it sewus to be proceeding in the right
track by system improvmnt, revision of laws, education of the producers
and merchants, and increased publicity. The original forecast and
plan appear to be appropriate in view of sucoessful results in the
supply and distribution of goods, in easing the traffic, in the
improvement of urban environment, and in. the alternative land use of
the Yongsan Market for an electronic ccmplex.
C. Target and Goal
231 In April 1980, the Government set up its basic plan to oonstruct a
wholesale market in each of four geographicaldivisions of the city
as part of its instituticnal narket project for agricultural and
marine products.
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AS the first step, the Garag-dong Market was constructed in the
South-East. SMG is planning to build a market in the North-East
(Sanggye Dong in Do Bong Gu) and in the South-West (Sin Jeng Dong in
Gang Seo Gu) by 1991 and in the North-West (Eun Pyung Gu) thereafter.
The Garag-dong Market, the first wholesale market built as part of the
Government's Long-term Wholesale Market Con.truction Project, covers
50% of the city's consumption, and the city will utilize the experience
gained in the cperation of this market in the planning, construction
and operation of the other markets.
The Government has estabLished its plan to construct wholesale
market in cities with a population of 300 thousand or more, and this
plan is being currently implemented.
232 Although the over-all strength of the nation has increased
substantially since the early seventies through industrialization in
all sectors of the national econamy, improved standards of living and
changes in the general conditions of livelihood, the marketing of
agricultural and marine products has remained undeveloped. In view
of such p-enc enon, the Government set up its project to construct
institutional wholesale markets, which was given top priority of
investment, and included it in the FiPLth Five-Year Plan.
2te population of Seoul is 24% of that of Korea and the prices of
agricultural and marine products are determined largely in Seoul.
Therefore, to apply the results of the operation of a..newly established
institutional market to the other such markets and to alleviate the
concentration of the marketing function, the Government considered the
following in the selection of the site for the Garag-dong market:
Garag-dong lies 15km south-east of business district of Seoul and
2.5km away from the new Jamsil area.
Garag-dong is near the South Ring Road, which is linked with the
Keoyngbu Expressway, the nain transportation route, and with Songpa
Main Street connecting Seongnam City to Seoul.
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233. Slaughtering facilities were originally planned to be constructed
by SMG. Hbwever, the National Livestock Cooperatives Federation
constructed these facilities and donated them to SMG.
D. Project Description
241 The construction of the Garag-dong Argicultural and Marine Products
Wholesale Market (Project A)
Construction of:
i) a fruit & vegetable market building (total floor space of
107,000 sq.m)
ii) a fish market building (total floor space of 40,000 sq.m)
iii) a related products market building (total floor space of
11,200 sq.m)
iv) Freezer storage facilities
v) an administration and market information center buile'ng
-.(total floor space of 11,590 sq.m)
vi) public utility facilities, including gas, electricity, water
and c=uuunication facilities and garbage and solid waste
treatment plants
242 The construction of about 3.5km of market-related roads, including
an underpass, intramarket streets and parking facilities.
243 Estab is)ment of the Seoul Agricultural and Marine Products Wholesale
Market Management Corporation (SAIO)
MT. n6aM4W=C
A. Provisions of Loan Agreement and initial date of construction.
311 On April 5, 1982, an Agreement was entered into between the borrower
and M=RD; additially on April 13, 1982, the borrower and Ban Yang
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Co. finalized their construction contract.
In accordance with the Agreement, the borrower began making
withdrawals fran IBRD starting from Aug. 6, 1982.
312 As scheduled, piles were put in place and bid invitations were issued
for the pricing of iron rods for international competitive bidding.
However, no bids were received on initial call for bids; therefore,
construction was delayed for three months.
313 Suggestions for amendment with regard to supplying of construction
materials are either taking measures for receipt of the materials in
advance of construction from the Office of Supply, or loosening of
restrictions in the Loan Agreement.
B. Adjustment: Construction Costs.
321 The total estimated cost for the construction was h'60,000 million
and no budget overruns were occurred. The road network and parking
facilities were constructed as originally planned, and all the other
market facilities are being used as expected at time when the market
plan was orawn up.
322 While there was no substantial change in the size and allocation of
the funds used for this project, U$12 million of the market construction
costs was provided from domestic sources. A reserve fund for physical
contingencies in the amount of U$2 million and an allowance for expected
price increase totalling U$5 million were not needed. Therefore, the
IBMD loan principal was reduced by an amount totalling U$19 million.
C. Execution of Construction Works
331 As of May 30, 1984, the project completion date, only 82% of the
works was completed due to the fact that the following factors were
not taken into consideration:
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• Caplexity of purchasing materials through the Korean Goverrment
Office of Supply.
*Time intervals for large scale construction project.
332 Significant reasons for the delay
*Failure to purchase materials (iron rods) on time.
It was mainly because the iron rods were purchased fran an overseas
market through international bidding.
•An adjustment was made in structures of P.C. top light.
•An a3justmnnt was made in substituting mild-bar iron rods for
high bar iron rods in the framing stage.
cother numerous minor adjustments.
*Not allowing enough time interr a1 between phases of construction.
D. ProcureM3nt
341 Method of procuremnt
Construction Works
On April 13, 1982, Han Yang Co. was selected as constractor among four
prequalified -bidders and a contract was ooncluded.
• Procurement of CtruMction Materials
Ircn rods, cement, electricity and machinery were purchased through
interational bidding while renicon and asoon were purchased via
domestic competitive bidding.
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342 Difficulties in procurement following Bank Group Guidlines
*International bidding
Excess documents were required which was time consuming and extra
manpower was required, e.g. site managers were more involved in
administrative work than in their responsibilities.
Failure to receive materials on time
Dcmestic competitive bidding
Reamicon and ascon were purchased through this method but it was
difficult to bid because the Korean Government Office of Supply set
the unit price of the materials at the beginning of the year.
Therefore, 5M2 directly took charge of the bidding.
343 Iror rods were exempted from value-added tax (vAT) due to procurement
through international bidding which resulted in the construction cost
curtailment.
E. Projected Cost for Construction
351 When the proposal was presented, the suppliers of funds and the
amounts to be supplied were as follows:
PLAN (millions)
.IBM W34,300 ($5O million)
• Government 27,200
SMS 8,200
Total 69, 700
Amounts actually supplied were as follows:
AMU%L (million)
IBRD W24,000
Government 20,800
SDG 14,100
lotal W58,900
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352 Reasons for lower cost
The ewected inflation rate of 10% per year was higher than the
actual figure; thus, the allowance for expected price increase was not
needed and the market was constructed with lower costs.
P. Withdrawals of twan Principal
361 Prior to June, 1983, larger amounts were disbursed than an w=ts
to be withdrawn fram the IBRD loan account per the original withdrawal
schedule, owins to the fact that construction materials had to be
procured earlier than expected.
By year-end 1985, however, only 61% of the total loan principal
(U$50 million), or U$30.3 million, was withdrawn due to a three month
delay in the construction process.
G. Evaluation of the ContLactors & the Suppliers
371 lo significant problem or sbortcmings arose in the performance
of Hban Yang Co., the contractor, and the suppliers.
IV. OPERAT= E uRE
A. Description
411 The market consists of four main buildings and ten smaller ones
on a 547,265 m2 site, with a total floor space of 197,142 m2 , in
which 8 authorized wholesale companies and 4,315 private traders from
Yongsan, Jung Eu, Namlaemoon, Cheongryangri markets engage in the trade
of agricultrual and marine products. Per the past operating records,
the daily throghpt of the Garag-dong Market includes 2,654 tons of
vegetables, 635 tons of fruit, and 340 tons of marine products.
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411-1 Marketing Process
a Producers and
shippers
ot~~~.
,;r N~~~~~~erchantsI
Authorized
Wholesalers
411-2 Major Functions
i) 7he Function of Gathering Goods (Authorized wholesalers)
8 authorized wholesale coqianies (5 for vegetable & 3 for marine
products) sell agricultural or marine products to the jobbers through
auction or bidding and collect a certain amount of conmissions from the
shippers or producers.
ii) The Pricing Function (Auctioneers)
Listed agricultural and marine products are consigned to the
authorized wholesalers that in turn sell them to the jobbers or bulk
buyers by auction or bidding
iii) The Distribution Function (Jobbers & Bulk buyers)
Jobbers buy the products through auction or bidding in the market
and sell them to retailers and collect certain amount of commissions
from the retailers.
Bulk Buyers handle transactions of products in the same way as the
jobbers and sell the goods directly to the consumers. They are
registered with SM.
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B. Salient Features
421
i) Market Utilization (daily averages)
The number of customers - 100,000
The number of vehicles that enter into or exit from the Market:
Truck 13,000
JwtuiMxbiles 10gS00
23,500
ii) Fruit & vegetable market
The market complex consists of the fruit & vegetable market building,
the truck sale building, entrance parking area, and exit parking
area.
The four authorized wbolesale cui,anies and oneof the National
Agricultural Cooperative Federation's (NXcr) public stores distribute
the.oonsigned fruit & vegetables via 1059 jobbers and 1719 auxiliary
jobbers at the fruit & vegetable market building and truck sale
b-lding.
462 shops, each of which is used by 2 to 3 jobbers, are located in
the two main buildings, and 1719 auxiliary jobbers handle the
produce in the shops erected on the exit parking area on a temporary
basis.
New buildings will be erected to a1-u1--lte the auxiliary jobbers and
retailers. The retailer - market building will be remodeled to
acouuurdate the vegetable jobbers' shops.
Currently existing lack of space for shops would be resolved in this
manner.
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iii) Fish Market
Two authorized wholesale companies and one of the public stores
of National Federation of Fishery Cooperativer (NFFC) operate
in the fish market.
The public store of NFWC and one authorized wholesale comapny deal
with fresh fish, while the other wholesale copany deal with dried
fish. The fish market building consists of 206 stores; 2 jobbers
are assigned to each of these stores.
As in the case of the fruit & vegetable market, 343 auxiliary jobbers
work in the temporary facilities built on the exit parking area
which will be replaced by a new building.
iv) Related Item and Retail Market Building
149 retailers handle items related to fruit and vegetables in 70
stores, while 71 retailers deal with fish related items in 31
stores.
Although 818 retailers originally applied for a store space in the
retail market building, $67 retailers currently occupy the buildinq.
A new building which is to arx-ioodate not only auxiliary jobbers but
also resident retailers is expected to alleviate the shortage of
stores in the fish market.
v) Freezer Storage
The freezer storage is being rented to and cperated by a cospany
with specialty in the area and supplies enough ice to the market.
Also, its storage function of marine products has been adequately
performed.
vi) Administration and Service Building.
The Admistration Building is being occupied by a banking branch of
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NACF, a pst office, SOACO and the Office of marketing laormation.
The Service Building, which is being managed by an outside canyV,
has barber shops, public bath facilities, restaurants, ancd lounges
for market users.
vii) Utility Buildings
Solid and liquid waste trealuent plants, as well as electricity,
gas, caimication and garbage disposal facilties are operated by
SAWAM. No significant pralems have thus far occurred in the
operatuo of tese facities for the market.
The gAsoline station which is managed by an outside ccpny, has
provided vehicular fuel needs adecuately.
viii)Despite partial ocoupation by the stores cperated by auxiliary
jobbers, the parking facilities have been sufficient to meet the
needs of the market users.
fTe road netsk provides ccnvenient :inkage to the highways.
ix) Office of Narketing Information.
a) System
I IA cA-
_~~~~~~~~~~Y Stf
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b) Items: 250 (Fruit and Vegetables: 120)
(Marine Products: 130)
c) Media: In-imarket: Electric bulletin boards, Informaticn TV sets,
and Printed materials
Nation-wide: TV, Radio, Newspaper, and
Autaatic Respne Sytem
d) Contents: Market Information: Items, grades, dealing anDuntp,
and bidding prices
Production Area Information: Main production area,
planting area, and estimated
aunt of shipment
x) Major Facilities
Ibtal area: 547,265 sq.m
Total Floor spaoe: 197,142 sq.m
Facility Area (m2) Contents
Fruit & Vegatable 1st floor: Auction area,
Market 106,859 Jobbers' stalls (462) &
Cold storage (dDc - 3'c)
2rd, 3rd floors: Restaurant,
Offices
Fish Market 39,844 1st floor: Auction area,
Jobbers' stalls (206) &
Cold storate (-2- --5 c)
Meat Market 13,879 Meat processing plant storage,
Entrails processing plant &
Eutcher shop
Truck Sale Area 3,840 Auction areas
Parking area (up to 448 trucks)
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Facility Area (m.2) Contents
Fruit & vegetable Packaging materials, Processed
Related Items Market 5,712 foods, tgricultural chemicals,
etc. (70)
Marine products Packaging materials, Canned
Related Items Market 2,565 goods, Fried marine products,
Snack shops, etc. (31)
Freezer Storage 4,698 Freezer storage (-40'c), Cold
storage (-200c), Stored ice
(100 tons), Ice manufacuring
facility (20 tons per day)
Service Building 3,186 Public Bath, Restaurants,
Lounges, Barber shops
Administration Ist floor: Bank, Post. office,
Building 11,635 Gallery & Information wooth
2nd flor: Restaurants
3rd floor: Marketing Information
Center
4th & 5th floor: Administrative
offices
Gas Station 690 Gas Pumps (8), Oil storage
(Capacity 200kl)
Parking Area 17,480 Capacity up to 4850 vehicles
Retail Store 5,718 Stores (818)
V. EnAIAL E09AM
A. Financial Results
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511 SAWMCO'As revenues are generated from market use fees (which are
oollected in proportion to trade performance), market rents, and
interest accruing on security deposits.
These revenues are barely sufficient to cover SAMO's operating
costs and definitely insufficient to provide funds necessary to repay
the principal of and interest on the IBRD loan.
On the other hand, collection of parking fees which may be collected
from the users of large parking facilities and that of training fees of
the merchants participating in the markets' training program have been
deferred for the purpose of vitalization and institutionalization of the
new market.
a. Market Fees
5/1000 of the transaction amounts is oollected from the 6 authorized
wholesale coamanies and the public stores of the National Agricultural
Cooperative Federation (&CF) and National Federation of Fishery
Cooperatives (NFC) as market use fees.
These omnpanies and public stores sell agricultural and marine
product on consignment by the shippers and deduct their cmnission
from the sales total withtin 60/1000 of the selling price. Market
fees are included in these commissions.
The Market opened in June, 1985 and started to collect market fees
from August 1, 1985. The market fee revenue was very lw during the
initial stage because of irregular trades which has been nearly eliminated
thanks to nore vigorous efforts made by market manageunt starting
from June, 1986.
The Market fees collected during the last one year amounted to
2,014 million won and are expected to significantly increase in the
future.
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b. Market Rents
Part of the buildings or facilities are rented out to the merchants
who do not directly take part in wholesale transactions. Rents are
charged at the rate of 6/100 of the cost of the facilities which are
rented for a one-year rental period.
At present, rental buildings include the retail market building,
fruit related goods building, fishery related goods building, freezer
storage service building and the gas station. Also, offices and
restaurants on the 2nd and 3rd floors of fruit market and fish market
buildings are leased out.
The rents collected for the year 1985 stood at 1,577 million Won.
SAMACM has rented out 54,000 sq.m., or 28% of the total floor space
of GM buildings.
c. Interest Inoe
The leasehold deposits received from the wholesalers and lessees
amnunted to 2,857 million Won. _Interest accrued on these deposits
totaled 385 million Won.
d. Other Items
Collection of parking fees, freezer storage use fees, training
fees, office rents of authorized wholesale companies, and store rents
of jobbers and auxiliary jobbers, has been deferred for the purpose
of vitalization of the new market as a matter of policy.
B. Financial Rate of Return
521 New Estimate and Reasons for Deviation
a. New Estimate of Financial Rate of Return
In the forecast report, the rate of return was calculated on. the
basis of revenues that may be generated from-two kinds of taxes and
an individual sources related to the market operations.
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VAT i=ne will be ninal. The Goverrmnt has exarpted the
authorized wbolesale caranes fraa taxes on their camission for
lsale agricultural and marine product transaction. it is
expected that for the caning 3 years, taxes levied on the jobbers
would be less than the taxes they paid when they were with the
Yconaan Market or any other markets in which they cperated prior to
their move to the new market. None of the autnorized wholesale
cangxnies has paid corporation tax to date.
Their settlemwnt of acxumts for the fiscal year 1985 showed
that they sustained a loss. mhe magnitude of the merchants' incone
tax burden has not been studied; however, there is every indication
that their tax burden did not increase dre primarily to the Government's
measure to have their VAT obligat reduced.
Parkin and freezer storage use fees amnug the operating revenue
sources have not been collected.
Every effort has been made to reduoe the marketing costs for the
producers and cosnmmers by reducing tax burdens and market use fees
and by promoting other measures for the vitalization of the
institutieoalized market.
In all, it apears difficult to determine -ratp r%f return as. was done
in the fcrecast report.
b. Reasons for Deviations from the Angaisal Estimate
Under the ircuanoe s mentioned above, efforts had to be made for
the vitalization of the market and. for the reducticn of marketing costs
by baving the Goverrment reduce the tax burden of the market related
people (authorized wholesale ccepanies, jobbers, etc.) in response to
their forceful demand fram the very initial stage of the market's
cperation.
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c. Other Convenant Provisions
Those matters agreed upon between SMG and SAZIACO have been carried
out to the satisfaction of the both parties.
C Financial Covenants (Contract 3.05 a - b)
As previously mentioned, SAMAOD's revenues at present are sufficient
to cover its operating costs, but not enouh to cover depreciation and
loan repayment.
Income sources will have to be expanded by raising market fees and
rents, extension of rental facilities, and by introduction of related
operations. However, these efforts are expected to come to fruition
after 2 to 3 years of operation.
The IBD loan was fully repaid as of July 31, 1986 to reduce our
nonetary burden.
we entered into contracts for a new commercial loan of Us15 million with
an annual interest of 9.19% and relatively low r exchange risk and for
another of Sfr37 million at tbe analual interest rate of 6%.
These new loan are to be repaid by 1996.
531 There are no particuaw financial agreements between 5S and
SAO. A mnmicizal ordinance of sMG and the Articles of Incorporation
of SAMAOCO, which are regulated by the TLcl Governent - owad Public
Corporation Law, provide that SAMI) submit its annual operational plan
and budget to the Mayor of the City of Seoul and obtain his approval
thereof.
The operational plan should follow the related policy line,
and SMG atte t to share the finanial burden of SAMICO in ce
where SA?MO finds it difficult to shoulder such burden for itself.
Thus the operation of SAMMO has been successfully carried out.
532 Ihere have been no covewnans which have not been observed since
the cpening of the Garag-dong Market.
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533 in cases where the mayor of the City of Seoul specifies the
operaticnal goal for SAMPO or makes a demand on the latter,
practicability is always taken into consideration and positive suport
is a d in each d f suci cases.
VI. I* l IIT UIONRL PER= AND IEVUOPME
A. gent and Organizational Effectiveness
611 Organization Chart for S C.
i Zze utive chairman of the
_Boad ,Board & President
| _ | ~AufAitor|
Director General Director General
of Alministration .of Business
f Department of I |Umtf Department o0 Office of
General Affairs f janagement I BuSan s Iaetinc Inf orrttn on
612 Quality of the Preset Management
(1) Segregation of Duties
.Department of General Affairs:
Planning and budgeting, Education of merchants, Public ion
arA etrnal relations, Personnel dinistratn, Accounting
.Departent of Management:
Maintenace of market facilities, Irovwznt of the envirocment
.Departent of Business:
Supervision and orientation for authorized wholesalers and
umrcbants, Settlements of tr n actions
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Office of Marketing Information:
Collection, eexamnation analysis and dissmination of marketing
information, Electronic data process8ing and related functions
(2) Administration
There is an Executive Board which is cctqosed of 6 directors.
While the President, who is also the Chairman of the Executive Board,
Director General of Administration, and Director General of Busines
serve on a full-time basis, Director General of the Bureau of Marketing
n the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Director General of the
Bureau of Industrial Economy in the Seoul Metropolitan Governmnt ard
a representative of the merchants serve on I*e EXecutive Board as
alternate executive directors. Each year, the Executive Board
resolves on the business plan, budgeting and settlement of accounts,
and submit them to the Mayor of the City of Seoul for approval.
Issues relating to the ccipany regulations, organization, staff size,
and changes in property are handled in the sara way.
The Auditor performs usual and periodic audit of accounting and
administrative matters
* The ePloyees of SAMACO are classified into six grades and technical
staff: First Grade - heads of departments; Second Grade - heads of
sectios; Third Grade - chief clerks, and so on.
I The operation of each department is planned and carried out by
business year. The results are analyzed for use as a feedback
in the planning for suWueqyent years.
613 Deviations from the Appraisal Report
The position of Vice President was not instituted for greater efficiency
in cperatior, and decision making.
- 25 -
For effectiveness of administration , one Director General controls
general affairs and management while the other takes charge of
supervision of merchants and transaction settlements as well as
narketing information. Although emphasis is placed on the
dissemination of marketing information, it seems sonewhat too early
to actively carry our merchant education,programs.
614 Additional Functions Given Priority
It is one of the highly important functions of an institutionalized
market to provide market information to producers and consumers.
A 24b compurer system is currently on a trial cperation in an effort
to pro ide prompt and sufficient information about transaction items,
amounts, prices, extent of a harvest and so on by means of television,
radio, newspaper auto-response telephones.
615 Changes for improvement is needed in all areas. A system most
appropriate for the efficient and effective management of this market
is being constantly sought, and there has been gradual improvement in
this area.
B. Staffing and Development of the Administrative Personnel
621 There have been three stages in staffing:
1st - There were 54 staff members when SAMUCO was established.
Four training courses were provided to them by university
professors with specialization in marketing.
2nd - During the preparation phase for market administration,
154 new staff members were selected by an examination and
and interview prooess.
3rd - During the market opening phase, 250 were recruited.
622 The euipoyees are paid at about 160% of the pay level of the
cooparable ranking officials with SMG. They are making extraordinary
efforts for the growth and inprovmemnt of the market.
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VII. ENCWI'IC REEVAUATION
It may be helpful for a future performance to analyze the economic
effect of a new investment and evaluate whether the plan has been
appropriate.
This project was our first business project. Techniques for
analyzing economic effectiveness involving the objectives and methodlogy
will be developed, and an economic analysis is exqpected to be perforned
within a few years.
VIII. BA- PEE4aNv=
811 Preparation of the Project I-lan
In 1976, the Government and IBRD held discussions on measures to
iaprove the marketing of agricultural and marine products. The
goverr4pent prepared a project plan report over the following two
years and determined to construct a wholesale market which would have
wodern facilities in the vicinity of Seoul.
SW held a conference with IMRM ooncerning a market construction
plan in April, 1980, and started fhmdation and sewerage works on
the market site in December of the same year. Prior to coapleticn
of the Project Plan in March 1981, IBRD bad experienoed specialists
review and evaluate the designs and the functions of the facilities
to be established. In the process, the IBRD specalists reconnended
that the building designs be changed to nore modern types, and their
remamendations were accepted in most part by SM5. In addition,
they reviewed important changes in th design to assist the construction.
812 The size of the project, construction of the road network,
and the timing of the construction, all of which were discussed with
ZERD officials, were proved to be appropriate after the opening of
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the market in view of market use by both the producers and oonsumers.
The loan conditions are considered appropriate except that interest
rate was higher as conpared to other loans.
813 here were no critical errors in the activities of IBRD relating
to the project formulation and evaluation. However, it was scmewhat
unreasonable to design the buildings with expectation that the trading
practices would rapidly be adjusted to the modern designs when the
design changes were made from conventional to modern types.
However, most of the difficulties relating to the new designs have
been resolved because SME accepted soae of the suggestions made by the
contractors and merchants in the process of construction of the market.
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Tablel Summary of Project Costs
In Won li.OOO mi4lion)
Domestic Foreign Total In US dollars
fund fund 
___________
Supplied by Constractors:
Roads and Utilities 3.8 2.5 6.3 5.0
Buildings 14.2 9.4 23.6 18.7
*echanical 3.1 2.0 5.1 4.0
Electrical 2.3 1.6 3.9 3.1
Sub-total 23.4 15.5 38.9 30.8
Supplied by Government:
Roads and Utilities 1.9 2.2 4.1 3.3
Buildings 2.0 3.5 5.5 4.4
Mechanical 1.0 1.1 2.1 1.7
Blectrical 2.6 0.3 2.9 2.3
Sub-total 7.5 T.1 14.6 11.7
Technical Supervision 1.4 0.0 1.4 1.1
Organization Costs of S9WAC0 1.5 0.0 1.5 1.2
Trainiag and Consulting 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Total 33.9 22.7 56.6 44.9
Loan Coaitmnt Fee 
- 0.5 0.5 0.4
Grand Total 33.9 23.2 57.1 45.3
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Table I! Revised Cost Estimate ( as-made by the Supervision Mission)
A. Construction and Installation
unit AmountQuantity Price(W) (Won million)
1. Roads and Utilities
Temporary' works 
- LS 530
Eartbfill 420,000cu m LS 528
Rockfill 182,TOOton LS 432
Paving Works 3,124a LS 1,945
Reinforce 17,50Gm3 LS 634
Add'l Sewage Treatment Plant - LS 304
Add'l Box Construction 
- LS 206
Add'l Sidewalk Pavement 
- LS 358
Landscaping 
- LS 63.2
fliscellaneous Works 
- LS 321
Installation Costs 
- L 450
6,320
2. Buildings
Tmporary Works LS 980
Excavation 60,000cu m 750 45
Earthfill 70,300cu a 2,400 168
Backfill 12,000cu m 1,100 13
stone pitching 34,000cu a '.T,000 578
Pile Driving 6,550ea 14,500 95
Reinforced Concerete 
- LS 3,242
Prestressed Concrete 26,OOOcu m 190,000 4,940
Precast Concrete 30,000sq m 32,000 960
Plastering 210,000sq a 5,200 1,092
Waterproofing LS 1,693
Tiles 11,000sq a 9,500 105
Doors and Windows 
- LS 1.848
Painting 
- LS 491
Finishing 
- LS 1,136
Add'l Work on Floors
of Fruit & Vegetable &'
Fish Markets 
- LS 220
Add'l Waterproofing 
- LS 136
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Table II (Continued)
Quqntityunit AmountQuqntity' Price (*) (Won million)
P.C. panel & Expansion
Joint Supplement 
- LS 90
Niscellaneous Work 
- LS 2,545
V. A. T. 1,213
LS 2,010
Installation Costs 
-360
23,600
Amount (Won -m4lon)
3. Mlechanical and Electrical Works ;;echanical -Electrical
Fruit and Vegetable Market 2,136 1,453
Fis8 larket 911 630
Administration Building 669 397
Service Building 200 48
Related Item Market 194 
- 148
Freezer Storage 241 73
Retail Storage 23 40
Substation 32 91
Gas Station 78 14
Solid Waste Plant 6 1
Miscellaneous 616 1,016
5,106 3,911
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Table II (Continued)
B. Furnished Equipment and Materials.
Quantityunit AmountQluant±ty >Price(*) (Won million)
1. Roads and Utilities
Cement 37,667bag 1,725 63
Accon 87,683 t LS 2,098
Deformed Steel Bars 1,698 t 202,591 302
Remicon 14,852 m 36,291 497
Crushed Stone 325,785 t IS 1,004
Eume Pipe 10,717 m LS 44
Piles 49 142,857 7
2iiscellaneous materials LS 85
2. Buildings
Deformed Steel Bars 8,698 t 204,760 1,781
Stand Steel Bars 734 t 424,788 312
Cement 222,13Tbag 1,725 383
Remdicon 60,232 m 40,825 2,459
Nume Pipe 2,152 m 2,788 6
Cement Blocks 20,267 ea 296 6
Round Steel Bars 200 t 240,500 47
Concrete Piles 6,588 ea 73,000 481
Cemenc brick 1,430,000sheet 42
3. IIechanical
Boilers 
- - 98
Air Conditioning Equipment - - 180
Steel Pipe 
- - 219
Waste Traatment IMotors - - x
EVAC Controls and Control Panel - 125
Freezing Plant 
- - 235
Ice Mlaking Plant - - 137
Condenser and Evaporator - - 604
Laneous laterial 
- _ 384
freight and Insurance - - 93
4. Electrical
Display Board 
- - 666
Display Controls - - 141
Conduit Pipes 
- - 133
Power Panel and 14CC - - 320
Transformers 
- - 118
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Table II (Continued)
Unit AmountQuantity Price(W) (W'on million)
Power Cubicle - - 571
Cable MIeters - -n
Stand-by Generator - - 236
Lamps - 4I#
Computer - - 118
Installations - 258
Wireih - 184
Freight and Insurance -- 48
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Table III Schedule of Withdrawals
In US dollars(nMiion)
Fiscal year Cu rt=lz Estimate Actual
'82 3/4 0.75 0.75
4/4 1.70 3.62
'83 1/4 4.60 7.49
2/4 7.10 9.02
3/4 12.00 11.72
4/4 15.45 12.89
X84 1/4 20.40 14.81
2/4 26.80 17.79
3/4 32.20 20.31
4/4 43.60 25.97
'85 1/4 46.50 28.96
2/4 50.00 29.85
3/4 30.14
4/4 30.32
Table IV. Operating Results
_- _- _ _________ __ , - ___ __- - - --…-…- ------ __…_ -
Square Measures Dail Number of Wholesalers & Jobbers Throughput
of Land & Buildings -Y -* _ (ton)
through Wholesale Auxiliary per mL of
Land Building put Jobbers Jobbers Floor Space
-- ~~~~--a....IL.L -- aLL tn CompaniesJobr FlrSpc
Fruit & Vegetable 154,972 118,379 3,289 5 1,059 1,719 0.028
t1arket
Fish Jlarket h1,163 39,843 340 3 40T 343 0.008
Total 202,435 158,222 3,629 8 1,466 2,062
__~~~~~ _ ______ ________ ___ ___ ___ __
lable V
CASH RECEIPTS AND DISBURSV'ENTS
(Nillion Won)
1983 '84 '85 86 '87 '8B 89 90 91 '92 '93 94 *95 '96 097-2006
Imarhet use tee - - 59 2*014 2-407 2*407 2.407 2.807 2.407 2.407 2.407 2*407 2.407 2.407 2*407
Routs 
- - 847 1.330 2.025 2*025 2*025 2*025 2*025 2*025 2.025 2.025 2.025 2*025 2.025
Interest 
- - 255 385 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130
Pasring fee - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
training fee 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ 
_
subsldy 954 3.039 5.281 5.194 1.420 1.599 3*970 6*110 5*998 5.896 5.806 5.726 5.660 5.610 1.219 w
Leasebold depodlts - - 2.857
Total 954 3.039 6.977 8.923 5.982 6.161 8.532 10.672 10*560 10*458 10*368 10*288 10.222 10*172 5,841
Cash dlsburseaints:
OperatIng expenss - 304 2.325 3*439 3.586 3.765 3954 4*1151 4.359 4.s57 4*806 5.046 5*298 5.563 56841
loss prinCipSi 954 1.539 4*161 5.194 2.396 2.396 8.78 6h521 6.201 5*881 5*562 5.242 4.924 4.609 -interestI
Iaterest 954 1.539 3.329 3*73T 2*396 2*396 2.396 2*157 1.837 I.517 l 1198 878 560 245 -
PrineApial- 
- 832 18457 - - 2.182 4.364 4.368 8.368 8.368 8.368 4.364 4.364 -
Icome taxes _ _ _ 
Total 958 2.043 6*486 8.633 5*982 6.161 8.532 10.672 10.560 10.458 10.368 10.288 10*222 10.172 5841
F5 - 996 491 290 - - - - _ 
_ _ 
_
-~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~ … ……… 
-
- - -
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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA - AGRICULTURAL WHOLESALE MARKETING PROJECT
- PART 8 (NATIONAL MARKETING MASTER PLAN STUDY)
I. INTRODUCTION
Title; National Marketing Master Plan Study - Korea
Loan/Credit Number; 2111-Ko (Part B)
Amount of Loan Agreement; US$500,000
Date of Loan Agreement; Apr. 5, 1982
II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL
A. Origin
o The fast urbanization and the rapidly increasing demand for
better food due to rapidly increasing consumer income since
1960s required more investments and changes of marketing or-
ganization and method in Korea. In such circumstances, and
IBRD appraisal team, who had examined the proposed first Urban
Agricultural Wholesale Market Project in Seoul in November 1977,
suggested to be Government of Korea (GOK) that a planning for
a nationwide investments in urban wholesale markets was pre-
mature in the absence of certain basic data. A financial as-
sstance was also suggested, in the form of an IBRD loan, for a
national marketing aster paln study (NMMPS) to collect and
analyze such data and to prepare for a systematic investment
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plan. Thereafter, a study was at first performed by Korea
Development Institute (KDI) working staff in its report "Korea
First Urban Wholesale Market Project", at July 1978.
O Roles of relevant parties for the NMMPS are follows:
a) The World Bank supplies up to 5D0 of total expenditures and
monitors the project to be implemented properly in accordance
with the loan agreement.
b) Ministry of Agriculture and'Fisheries (MAF) makes the necessary
arrangements for timely execution of the studies, such as em-
ploying consultants to carry out the research work, paying
consultancy fee,, monitoring the progress.of the research work,
making suggestions relevant to their successful execution as
necessary, and maintaining reccrds and procedures of the pro-
Ject.
c) Consultants
- Korea Rural Economics Institute (KREI) has an overall res-
ponsibilities for the implementation f the research work
as a leading consultant. It also employs domestic onsultants,
consults to MAF for employing foreign consultants, and main-
tains records and procedures of the project.
- Experience Incorporated, Co, the selected foreign consultant
team,carries out the research work in the field of developing
an optimum transshipment model, food storage and processing,
and analysis of the marketing information system.
- 41 -
o NFFC and AFDC were considered improper tQ carry out research work
efficiently in cooperation with KREI, mainly due to their organi-
zational characteristics as one of active marketing institutes.
But NACF which possesses proper researchers took parts in the
project as a domestic consultant in the field of marketing in
producing areas.
B. Preparation, Appraisal, Negotiation and Approval
a The KDI working staff originally prepared the project in July 1978,
in response to the suggestion of an IBRD appraisal team which
visited Korea in November 1977 to review the First Urban Wholesale
Market Project. Among the team member, an FAO/UNDP staff suggested
the MMMPS at first in Korea. After that, the original project pro-
gram was revised by the IBRD mission (mission leader, B. Bermann
and H.J. Mittendorf, FAO Senior Marketing Economist) in cooperation
with MAF and KREI in September 1978, by KREI in October 1980, and
finally by an IBRD consultant (Dr. Harrison) in cooperation with
KREI in December 1981. In the course of the project preparation,
many World Bank missions and staffs suggested the coverages and
methodologies of the studies and took directly parts in the for-
mulation of the project. Many Korean governmental staffs also
assisted to prepare the project program and to collect necessary
data.
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o The significant changes of the final proje;t program which was
prepared by Dr. Harrison and KREI from the original one which was
prepared by KDI working staff are follows:
a) Project costs were reduced from US$2,120 thousand to US$1,000
thousand.
b) More detailed program was suggested in the final one.
c) Flowers were added to commodities under consideration.
d) Most consultants for research were substituted to domestic per-
sonnels from expatriate ones, excepting agricultural marketing
economist, cold storage expert, and marketing information expert.
e) Feasibility studies of the agricultural market improvement pro-
ject proposed for 1982-1986 Development Plan, which was included
in the Staff Appraisal Report, were not to be performed mainly
due to loss of timelyness by the delay of project contract.
The changes were, even so reporter's personal opinions, due to
changes of environmental circumstances and recognitions of the
project, changes of responsible personnels in both of Korean Govern-
ment and the Bank during negotiation and approval, and delay of ne-
gotiation approval and contract with consultants for research.
However, the Bank and the Borrower readily agreed on them without
any nmnner imposed. In retrospect, it's hard at present to Judge
its beneficial. But we think it was one of the best choices at
the situations.
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o The covenants included in the loan agreemept were exactly observed
without any reservation and rejection.
o But project implementation was delayed at least a half year due
to the differences of opinion between the Bank staffs and Korean
Government staffs. The most serious phase was to adjust the range
of participations of expatriate consultants for research and timely
supply of due domestic fund. There were unciear understandings of
the governmental staffs on the procedures of expatriate consultants
employment and its terms of reference.
o As for appointment of consultants, we at first expected to employ
Dr. Harrison, who was consultant of the Bank for this project and
prepared the final project program; is an expatriate consultant
because we thought he had considerable understanding and experiences
on this kind of projects in Latin America. But this opinion was
rejected by the Bank due to the qualificatory restriction in terms
of reference for the employment of the expatriate consultants.
The Bank also strongly requested to include NACF in the domestic
consultants in spite of our h >Ion considering the difficulties
in coordination among consultants. As results, NACF took parts in
the field of marketing in producing areas.
C. Targets and Goals
o Government's long-term development program for agricultural markets
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is to transform dominant quasi-wholesale markets to legal wholesale
markets through the construction of comprehensive agricultural
markets In cities nationwide and to link these narkets as national
system for the purpose of Increasing marketing and pricing effici-
encies. In the comprehensive wholesale markets, transaction method
will be changed from consignment-sale dominate to auction sale for
pricing efficiency. The Garag-dong market is the first one and a
pilot project for the national market system improvement.
D. Project Description
This project is a study of Korean agiicultural marketing system,
including feasibility studies of various compopents of the agricul-
tural marketing improvement program as a part of the Government's
Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1982-86). But feasibility
studies of the program of that period were excluded in implementa-
tion stage as mentioned above.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Effectiveness and Start-up
o The conditions of effectiveness for this project were employment of
consultant and making contract with competent consultants.
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o We expected to start the project before 1982 originally and to
contract with consultants by the first half of the year. But the
project set formally in implementation i July 1983 under the con-
tract approved by the Bank, even if we had launched the project in
September 1982 under a provisional contract with a domestic consul-
tant (KREI) without official approval from the Bank.
O Some misunderstandings of the recommendations and regulations im-
posed by the Bank and its staffs were the important causes to delay
the employment of expatriate consultants and the contract agreement.
o The selection and employment of the expatriate consultants in ac-
cordance with the terms of references tightly imposed by the Bank
were difficult at the start-up period for the project progressors
who had not experienced in employing foreign consultants according
to the terms imposed by international institute such as the.Bank
and were familiar only with contracting procedures in local project.
We think the delay of start-up made the consultants haste with time
schedule and pressed to induce some hasty results without s,4 tficient
review of collected ata. We also consider the regulations o
tightly ioposed were the important cause of delay and influenced
on the quality of the project significantly. Therefore, our opi-
nions are that more emphasis had to be given to the results of
proJect than procedures in the case of such a research project to
avoid loss of time.
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B. Revisions
o The lnportant changes made after effectiveness were the reduction
of project fund from the original 732 million won (1 million US$
equivalence) to442 million won, the exclusion of grains out of
the commodities under consideration in scope of research, and
some reduction of consultants employment periods.
o The reduction of project fund caused from the restrictions on the
supply of local portion of the project cost. The reduced project
fund makes it inevitable torestrict he scope of research. But
we at first thought o perform all the scopes of project, as pos-
sible as we can, through the,intensive contribution fthe consul-
tants and proportional reduction of the due durations of the con-
sultants. We, however, eventually excluded grains from the com-
modities under consideration, considering great dependabilities
of the grain market on government policies and uncertainties of
the government grain policies at that time. Major portion of
grain markets, especially rice market which is the most important
crop in Korea, is under the direct control of the government and
the government at the time took the most portion of governmental
rice procurement and control over the farmer's cooperatives or
private sector. Important changes of government policies can make
some research results useless.
o Changes mentioned above implicitly informed the Bank staffs who
visited Korea without any positive rejections.
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C. Implementation
o After effectiveness, there was no any important delay of schedule
even if there might be a little gap with the original in the pro-
gress of research by the consultants.
0. Procurement
o No procurement was concerned with the project.
E. Costs
o A breakdown of actual and estimated project costs is as follows:
(in thous. US$)
Year Fund Appraisal Original2, Adjustel Actual
Source Report/ Contract- Budget_/ Expenditure
1982 Domestic 55 109 45 45
Foreign 55 - - -
Total 110 109 45 45
…___________________________________ ____ ____ ____ ______
1983 Domestic 200 195 120 120
Foreign 200 204 143 143
Total 400 399 263 263
… -------------------------- - --- -…--- - --------------------- ------
1984 Domestic 245 196 137 127
Foreign 245 296 157 144
Total 490 492 294 271
Total Domestic 500 500 302 292
Foreign 500 500 300 287
Total 1,000 1,000 602 579
Note: * Constant exchange rate of 1*732 for one US$ applied througout
the project period. Exchange rate did not really affect he
expenditure b cause all of the foreign costs were directly
paid to consultants ondollar basis.
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1/ The Bank mission Dr. Harrison's estimation in Dec. 1982.
11 Contract with leading consultant KREI.
I/ The budget adjusted by MAF in 1984.
O The most important cause of cost reduction was the restriction
cn the supply of local source of fund.
F. Disbursements
o Source of funds of the actual expenditure are about US$292 thousand
from the Government and about US$287 thousand from the Bank loan in
total.
o Expenditures by the major categories are as follows:
(in thous. US$)
Categories Appraisal Report- Actual Expenditure
o Remuneration for domestic cons. 295.8 221.2
o Remuneration for foreign cons. 247.6 142.5
o Overseas trip 130.0 81.3
o Local trip & field survey 117.9 102.9
o Printings 12.5 31.8
o Computer use 32.0 22.4
o Office equipment & supplies 22.1 3.3
o Communication & transportation 96.1 10.7
o Conference 3.0 3.9
o Contingency 43.0 11.7
o Total 1,000.0 578.9
Note: * Expenditures from domestic sources were converted to USS equiva-
lence, using the rate of V732 for one US$ constantly and rounded.
1/ Dr. Harrison's estimation.
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6. Performance
o The consultants made their bests to draw the best results in short
period. But the rroject was too enormous to complete within over
2 years with restrictive data and budgets. About the results, we
satisfy the conclusive r sults even if there are a few shortcomings
in coordinating the proposed projects among sub-sectors.
o The Bank mission strongly suggested to recruit he NACF staffs in
the project in the fields of agricultural marketing in producing
areas and others. But it seems that too many institutions involved
in a single research project without orderly control device could
make the team leader be difficult to coordinate he various opin-
ions from diverse consultants
IV. OPERATING PERFORMANCE
o On completing the project in Dec. 1984, we collected various opin-
ions from working-level staffs and managers of the institutions
concerned and from professors through meetings and conferences.
Accroding to the suggested opinions, the KREI prepared a Korean
version of complementary report in July 1985. We are now collec-
ting opinions and improvement programs from local government mainly
on the construction of comprehensive agricultural wholesale markets
and are reviewing the research results and the opinions suggested
by various persons for the establishment of a detailed implementa-
tion program for the improvement of the national agricultural mar-
keting system.
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V. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE, INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE ANDDEVELOPMENT,
AND ECONOMIC REEVALUATION
o No relevant items for NMMPS.
VI. BANK PERFORMANCE
A. Project Justification and Objectives
o The Bank's suggestion on the need of this project in 1978 and its
loan conditions were appropriate in retrospect at the time. There
was also no any important event reinforcing the validity of ori-
ginal emphasis.
B. Project Control and Scheduling
o The contents of project were appropriate xcept a little tight
time scheduling.
C. Project Implementation a d Operating Outcomes
o The Bank's preagreement requirements and modifications were a little
excessive. Many years had taken to strart-up and to complete the
project after it was at first proposed in 1978, in spite of its
urgent need in Korea. During the time, nany persons of the Bank
and MAF had involved and changed in the project and suggested
various opinions. The delay might have brought discouragement
of the governmental staffs concerned towards the project, which
was followed by decreased supply of local funds and perhaps quali-
- 51 -
tive degrading of the research. Delay of the original time sched-
ule might be caused by the complicated loan agreement producure
which was signatured on April 5, 1982 and by many times of changes
in contents of the project without objectives change and decisive
improvement.
o The Bank's assessment of the domestic consultant's implementation
capacity seems to be a little underestimated at preparation stage.
The Bank's staff suggested to employ expatriate consultants exc-
cessing our requirement considered. We had thought it would take
fairly long time for expatriate consultants to understand even the
prevailing practices in the Korean agricultural marketing system.
At present, we think in retrospect the employment of all consul-
tants from a single institute which can orderly be controlled by
a team leader would be more efficient in implementation and coor-
dination among sub-sectors for such a large research project.
o Bank supervision and working relationship for the project were
adequate and fair.
o The Bank made its most significant contribution to the project
at maybe the project formulation stage.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
o The results of research is fairly exact and successful and will
mark a milestone in the progress of Korean agricultural marketing.
The result will also be a good guideline for the Government o
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establish programs for the improvement of agricultural marketing
system in the future. But some continuitive reviews and modifi-
cations and collection of various opinions from diverse level of
persons concerned for concensus will be needed in the future for
the result to be a realizable action programs.*
MAP SECTION
WU 1583811
REPUBUC OF KOREA 127-00 1271w
AGRICULTURAL WHOLESALE MARKETING PROJECT
CITY OF SEOUL 6 "N",
* PROPOSED NEW MARKET SITE
O OTHER FUTURE MARKET SITES
- - - FUTURE MARKET SERVICE AREA BOUNDARIES
* EXISTING WHOLESALE FRUIT AND VEGETABLE MARKETS
* EXISTING WHOLESALE FISHMARKETS
3740' SUPPLY ROUTES (% of Totaol) 3740
S FRUIT Al ID VEGETABLES
FISIi
PRIMARY ROADS
-.-- t RAILWAYS
CENTRAL SEOUL CITY AREA
- GU (DISTRICT) BOUNDARIES
- SEOUL SPECIAL CITY BOUNDARIES 7%
KILOMETERS
Inchane SEOU
1 5 02
. . . . . I.DO
dieju~ ~ ~~~~~~~RATOA
Ado .kIRPORDE. PL' RP O KRA 7gnn
12650 127YONG D 0
79 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~A ~
\ ._ ' |>,,f
., , \ ,! o o} >< . - C~~~~S S ' \,=, °C // v ss b '" 
\' % \1 \ \ \ \ L i / v * 8~~~~~~~~~~~~~l% il
X"1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0
iA~~~~~~~ L
x ~~REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
AGRICULTURAL WHOLESALE |SONGNAM CITY
MARKETING PROJECT \
LAND USE 3
Kai ag Dong / 
ROADS: ( N
_ EXISTING MAJOR ROADSJ 
__m PROPOSED MAJOR ROADS 
EXISTING PRIMARY ROADS
-- PROPOSED PRIMARY ROADS
0000O SUBWAY UNDER CONSTRUCTION
| 8 PROPOSED RAILWAY 
RESIDENTIAL AREAS: i .
HIGH DENJSITY |N| PEOK'SREP.FcEJ 
.5,..,LOW DENSITY ; s.°
F COMMERCIAL AREAS ^.EOLS
WATER SUPPLY.J>- r 
EXISTING ,{, t 
PROPOSED i 
GAS PIPELINE ,b:T}
EXISTING Vtj *3 
-- RMFSEDI Jo;JI
~~154 KV TRANSMISSION LINE (PROPOSEDI/ 'S /.
O, .S , .s 2 %/; ;
_ 07R w_el- PANGYO ~~~~~~~~~~~~INTERCHANGE . , 3 XrOP -120¢ t '! 3~~~~~~~~~~~F M
laRD 15846R
REPUBLIC OFKOREA
AGRICULTURAL WHOLESALE MARKETING PROJECT
MARKET SITE PLAN /1
. ///p//-St r / / T\°a\\ *tENT FUNT~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~N PAII
e S F j ' X < 50 1C000 41
I 11 \ / [ | Asvs g I3I 
< X 9 - . X-t4 4 W~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
